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Abstract 
Adaptive power system protection can be used to improve the 
performance of existing protection schemes under certain 
network conditions. However, their deployment in the field is 
impeded by their perceived inferior reliability compared to 
existing protection arrangements. Moreover, their validation 
can be problematic due to the perceived high likelihood of the 
occurrence of failure modes or incorrect setting selection with 
variable network conditions. Reliability (including risk 
assessment) is one of the decisive measures that can be used 
in the process of verifying adaptive protection scheme 
performance. This paper proposes a generic methodology for 
assessing the reliability of adaptive protection. The method 
involves the identification of initiating events and scenarios 
that lead to protection failures and quantification of the 
probability of the occurrence of each failure. A numerical 
example of the methodology for an adaptive distance 
protection scheme is provided. 
1 Introduction 
New generation technologies and operational practices are 
being introduced to electrical power system to alleviate 
system capacity constraints, and facilitate the integration of 
greener energy sources. These changes, however, can result in 
performance issues with existing protection systems. 
Increased penetration of distributed generation (DG) for 
example, can result in failure to detect faults as well as miss-
coordination between distribution line protection functions 
(overcurrent relays, recloser and fuses) [1, 2]. FACTS devices 
adjust transmission line parameters to control power flow or 
improve system stability. These can have an effect on the 
reach of distance protection or can cause malfunction in 
directional elements [3, 4].    
Adaptive protection can offer an effective solution to some of 
the performance shortfalls experienced by existing protection 
schemes. Adaptive protection has been discussed widely in 
technical literature, such as in [5-7], but has not been 
commonly implemented in practice due to concerns related to 
the validity of the adaptive scheme operation. 
In this paper, a generic methodology for reliability assessment 
of adaptive protection schemes is proposed as part of the risk 
assessment process. The method involves the identification of 
initiating events and scenarios that lead to protection failures 
and the quantification of the probability of occurrence of each 
failure [8]. Two stages are involved in the identification of the 
protection failure modes: Failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA) and Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). 
FMEA identifies failure modes of each component of the 
system and evaluates the severity of the failure modes to the 
systems. Meanwhile HAZOP identifies hazards which may 
arise within the system but are not caused by the component 
failures. For the quantification of the probability of the 
occurrence of hazards, a Bayesian Networks technique is 
used. Bayesian Networks is a powerful method used in 
probability calculations which provides flexibility in 
modelling of complex systems. 
To illustrate the proposed methodology, a case study is 
presented which assesses the reliability of an adaptive 
distance protection when applied to transmission lines with 
quadrature booster transformers. 
2 Adaptive protection 
Adaptive protection is defined in IEEE std C37.113 as ‘a 
protection philosophy that permits, and seeks to make 
adjustments automatically, in various protection functions to 
make them more attuned to prevailing power conditions’[9].  
From the definition, there are three main functions that the 
adaptive protection must perform: 
a. Monitor changes in the power system conditions and 
determine the system state; 
b. Find optimal protection settings, characteristics or logic  
accordingly; 
c. Modify the protection settings, characteristics or logic 
automatically.  
The modifications include pick up thresholds, reach settings 
and operate/restrain characteristics. Settings can be 
automatically calculated based on network parameters, such 
as in [6], or by using look-up tables with several pre-
determined setting groups [5, 10]. 
Changes from one setting to another are not instantaneous; 
there is always a time delay. If a fault occurs during the time 
of changeover, the protection is assumed to work incorrectly. 
Therefore, in order to reduce this risk, the time delay should 
be as small as possible. The number of setting groups is 
usually related to the expected variation of power system 
condition. More setting groups can provide better protection 
scheme coverage and potentially improved performance. 
However, this also means that the setting changes take place 
more often. This can result in an increased risk of incorrect 
operation. 
3 Failure modes of adaptive protection 
Operational modes of adaptive protection can be classified 
into three categories: 
a. Desirable operation; 
b. Failure to operate; 
c. Unwanted operation. 
A desirable operation is when the protection operates for 
faults in its protected area and does not operate when there is 
no fault in its protected area. The probability of hidden 
failures i.e. protection failures during normal system 
conditions, is assumed to be negligible. This is because 
components such as relays, circuit breakers, CTs, VTs, dc 
power sources are equipped with self-testing/supervision 
functionality. Therefore, this type of failures is not included 
in the calculations presented in this paper. 
Failure to operate is a condition when the protection fails to 
operate for faults in its protected area whereas unwanted 
operation is a condition when the protection operates when 
there is no fault in its protected area. These two failure modes 
are considered in this assessment. 
Failure to operate of a protection system can be caused by:  
a. Protection components failures, such as relay hardware 
failure, circuit breaker being stuck and dc supply failure; 
b. Special conditions where the protection cannot see the 
fault, such as high resistive faults. 
Unwanted operation modes are initiated by: 
a. Protection components’ unwanted operation, such as 
unwanted operation of breaker; 
b. Spurious tripping of a relay for an external fault. 
Alongside the sources of failure in conventional protection, 
adaptive features can introduce additional sources of failure. 
The following is a brief list of them: 
a. Primary system event detection 
Sensing the primary system changes is an essential task of 
the adaptive function. Therefore sensors and detection 
methods must be reliable. The sensing equipment may 
suffer some failures and detection methods may provide 
false information. Thus the impact on the protection 
performance must be assessed.  If sensing equipment is 
placed remotely from the rest of the adaptive protection 
functions, then some form of communication is needed. 
Consequently, their reliability should also be assessed. 
b. Adaptive setting selection 
Based on primary system condition, the adaptive functions 
select or calculate the settings for the relay accordingly. 
This adaptive calculation or selection may also suffer 
from the failures. These are mainly caused by hardware 
failure, software failure or inadequate adaptive scheme 
design. For assessment of software failure, software 
reliability engineering methods can be applied, such as in 
[11]. 
c. Fault coverage of each setting 
For each setting, the probability of failure to operate and 
the probability of unwanted operation needs to be 
assessed.  
d. Default settings 
A default setting must be fixed in case of the adaptive 
function failure. Therefore it’s probability of failure to 
operate and unwanted operation is also need to be 
assessed for each primary system condition. 
4  Methodology for the assessment of adaptive 
protection reliability  
Based on well-known methods for risk assessment [8, 12], a 
generic method for adaptive protection reliability assessment 
is proposed. The method is specifically tailored to deal with 
the issues of adaptive power system protection. The 
methodology for the adaptive protection reliability assessment 
is described in the following sections. 
4.1 Collection of system information 
Information about the protection system and the protected 
primary system is collected. This includes physical 
components and their function, layout or interconnection of 
the components, operating logic, successful operation criteria, 
embedded software and system operating conditions. 
4.2 Identification of initiating events for the protection 
failure modes 
Initiating events of each failure mode can be found using 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) studies [8]. FMEA starts with a list of 
adaptive protection components and then identifies their 
failure modes. The effects of these failure modes are then 
investigated further to obtain their impact on the system.  
The FMEA cannot provide all failure modes within the 
system, because not all of the system failure modes are 
caused by component failures. For this reason HAZOP is 
applied. HAZOP identifies initiating events of the system 
failures which are not caused by components failures. Lists of 
sources of protection system failures in section 3 can be used 
to generate the failure modes of the system. 
4.3 Quantification the occurrence of each failure 
In order to calculate the probability of an occurrence of each 
failure mode, some well-known methods can be applied such 
as Fault tree analysis, Markov chains and Bayesian Network. 
However, Bayesian network method is recommended since it 
provides flexibility in modelling and simplicity in data 
requirement [13, 14]. 
Modelling the reliability problem using Bayesian Network 
starts with a qualitative part, a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 
This represents failure modes of the protection in relation to 
their causes (initiating events). To construct the DAG, 
network variables (nodes) need to be defined based on the 
available data. There are three types of variables: query 
variables (for which the probability must be calculated), prior 
variables (input data) and intermediary variables (these model 
the relation between prior and query variables). The next step 
is to define the network structure (edges) of the DAG which 
shows a causal relationship between variables.  
After the DAG is constructed, the qualitative part needs to be 
performed which defines Conditional Probability Tables 
(CPTs) for each edge. The CPT shows probability of a state  
occurring  for each given cause.  Finally, the calculation of 
the query variable is performed automatically using Bayesian 
Network software. An  example  DAG and its CPT is shown 
in section 5.3.The construction of a DAG for each failure 
mode can be done separately before being integrated for the 
whole system. 
5 Case study: Adaptive distance protection 
The prototype adaptive distance protection scheme proposed 
in [3, 10], is used to provide a numerical example of the 
adaptive protection reliability assessment. It is designed to 
overcome distance protection under-reach problems caused 
by the presence of a quadrature booster transformer (QBT) in 
the transmission system. QBT is widely used to control active 
power flow in the transmission line. The following sections 
present the application of the proposed methodology for the 
case study reliability assessment. 
5.1. Collection of system information 
The primary system consist of two identical lines, with 
substation B in between as shown in Figure 1 [3]. The QBT is 
placed at substation B, and the adaptive protection is located 
at the beginning of transmission line AB (R1). Transmission 
and protection data are given in the Appendix.  
 
Figure 1: Transmission line with a QBT and an adaptive distance 
protection at R1 [3]  
The boost and buck operation of the QBT results in zone 2 
protection  under-reach if conventional distance protection is 
installed at R1 as reported in [3]. Therefore, an adaptive 
distance protection is installed at R1 to compensate for the 
under-reach according the QBT operational states. The 
adaptive distance protection scheme has two pre-determined 
setting groups, setting group 1 (SG1) is used when the QBT is 
in the bypass state and SG2 for boost or buck states. The 
difference between the two setting groups is only in the zone 
2 reach setting (refer to the Appendix). At R2, a non-adaptive 
conventional distance protection is installed, because there is 
no effect of the QBT on the performance of this protection. 
The QBT has 20 taps for boost and 20 taps for buck mode of 
operation, and each tap position results in a different level of 
protection under-reach which also depends on the type of 
fault in the line. To quantify this impact and verify the 
protection operation the scheme was simulated using Real 
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [15]. 
The operating logic of the adaptive scheme is shown in  
Figure 2. The QBT operation states are controlled using a set 
of switches, which enables bypass or buck-boost operation. 
The QBT state information is obtained from the switches’ 
status indications. The QBT state information is sent to the 
adaptive protection controller (ABB COM600 substation 
gateway) through a communication network. This 
information is used to select a relay setting group from the 
setting group pool. Once the setting group has been chosen, 
then it is sent to the distance relay to be activated. 
 
Figure 2: The operating logic of the adaptive distance protection. 
5.2 Identification of the initiating events of the protection 
failure modes 
The initiating events of the protection failure modes are 
identified using FMEA and HAZOP techniques. The failure 
modes and their initiating events are summarized as follows: 
a. For failures to operate the initial causes are:  
For zone 1 
 Protection component failures. 
For zone 2 (if primary protection fails) 
 Protection component failure; 
 Adaptive function failure; 
 QBT operational states indication failure 
 Faults occurring during the time of setting 
switchover from SG1 to SG2 (causing protection 
under reach). 
 Zone 2 protection under-reach for phase-to-phase 
faults when SG2 is applied as shown in Table 1. 
QBT 
state Tap 
Non detected L-L faults 
starting at (% of line AB) 
Boost 20 148 
Buck 11 148 
Buck 12 147 
Buck 13 145 
Buck 14 143 
Buck 15 140 
Buck 16 136 
Buck 17 134 
Buck 18 130 
Buck 19 126 
Buck 20 122 
Table 1: Zone 2 reaches when SG2 is applied to relay R1. 
 
b. For spurious tripping, the initial cause is: 
  unwanted operation of protection components 
5.3. Quantification the occurrence of each failure 
The reliability assessment for failure to operate is only 
conducted on zone 2 of the distance scheme since there is no 
requirement to adaptively alter zone 1 reach. A fault tree 
illustration for this failure mode is shown in Figure 3. The 
fault tree shows that the scheme will fail to clear a fault in 
zone 2 when both primary protection and the distance 
protection fail. The adaptive protection can fail to operate 
because one of these causes: the protection component 
failure, the adaptive function fails, under-reach during SG2, 
under-reach during switchover from SG1 to SG2 or the QBT 
state indicator failure. However, in this paper, only the 
‘under-reach during switchover from SG1 to SG2’ cause is 
described in detail. 
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Figure 3: Fault tree illustration for zone 2 operation failures 
 
The Bayesian Network’s DAG of the fault tree in Figure 3 is 
shown in figure 4.  The probability calculation of the DAG 
was carried out using the GeNIe software from the University 
of Pittsburgh [16].  
The protection components’ failure probabilities are based on 
statistical data or generic data from [17-21]. The components 
include: CT, CVT, numerical distance relay, circuit breaker, 
dc source, wiring and telecommunication.  
The factor influencing the probability of the protection under-
reach due the time delay during the setting switchover from 
SG1 to SG2 is shown in Figure 5. The Probability is 
determined by the length of time required for the switchover 
operation, type of fault occurring in the protected line and the 
QBT state during switchover. Table 2 shows probability of 
switchover taking place, which is prior data to the ‘settings 
switchover’ node. The state ‘switchover’ represents the 
probability of the adaptive protection in transition of 
switchover from SG1 to SG2. The probability is obtained 
from total number of switchover multiplied by a switchover 
duration, then divided by the total  operation times of the 
adaptive protection. Tables 3 and 4 show prior probability of 
node ‘type of fault’ and ‘QBT states’ respectively. Data of the 
QBT node and settings switchover node are estimated under 
assumed the QBT operational scenario. 
 
Figure 4: Bayesian Network model for the adaptive distance 
protection 
 
Figure 5. DAG for protection under-reach during switchover 
switchover 0.0002261767 
Not switchover 0.9997738233 
Table 2: Prior probability of ‘Settings switchover’ node 
L-G L-L L-L-L-G 
0.78 0.15 0.07 
Table 3: Prior probability of ‘type of fault’ node 
Bypass 0.2 
Boost Tap 1 – Tap 20, probability for each tap 0.3 
Buck Tap 1 – Tap 20, probability for each tap 0.1 
Table 4: Prior probability of ‘QBT states’ node 
The ‘protection under-reach during switchover’ node contains 
a conditional probability table (CPT) as shown in Table 5. 
This table only shows some parts of the CPT due to space 
limitations. The CPT contains all combinations of states from 
the ‘QBT states’, ‘type of fault’ and ‘settings switchover’ 




Type of fault LL 
QBT States Boost19 Boost20 Buck1 Buck2 Buck3 Buck4 
 Relay sees 
the fault 0.5 0.48 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.7 
Relay cannot 
see the fault 0.5 0.52 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.3 
Table 5: Conditional Probability Table of ‘protection under-reach 
during switchover’ node 
QBT operational state information is obtained from the 
bypass switches. If the switch indications fail to provide its 
state, then the adaptive protection may select an incorrect 
setting group. The Bayesian Network model for this issue is 
shown in Figure 4 (protection under-reach caused by QBT 
operational indicator failure node). The variables input for 
this under-reach node are: the QBT operation indicator failure 
probability, relay settings (SG1 or SG2) probability, fault 
types probability and the QBT states probability. The failure 
probability of the QBT operational indicator is based on 
switch indicator failure data from [18, 21], while the SG1 and 
SG2 probability is estimated under assumed the QBT 
operational scenario.  
In order to provide the security of protection, zone 2 of SG2 
has to compromise its dependability. Therefore, there are 
small parts of the line faults which cannot be seen by the relay 
zone 2 comparator. The probability of this protection under-
reach with SG2 applied is calculated using Bayesian networks 
as shown in Figure 4 (protection under-reach during SG2 
node). This effect is influenced by the type of fault and the 
state of QBT during the fault. The probability values of the 
protection under-reach during phase-to-phase fault according 
to QBT state are shown in Table 6. The results are based on 
the RTDS simulation of the fault and protection response. 
Table 6 only shows the QBT states having a non-zero 
probability of protection under-reach. Other states having 
zero probability have been omitted. The quantities in the table 
are calculated based on data in Table 1 using (1): 





   (1) 
where: 
=faultL length of line where undetected faults take place 
=totalL total length of zone 2 reach in line BC 
Unwanted operation failure mode is caused by the protection 
component spurious tripping when no fault occurs.  The DAG 
for this failure mode is not shown here because of space 
limitation, but the calculation result is given in section 5.4. 
 
QB State Protection see faults Protection Blinding 
Boost20 0.96 0.04 
Buck 11 0.96 0.04 
Buck 12 0.94 0.06 
Buck 13 0.9 0.1 
Buck 14 0.86 0.14 
Buck 15 0.8 0.2 
Buck 16 0.72 0.28 
Buck 17 0.68 0.32 
Buck 18 0.6 0.4 
Buck 19 0.52 0.48 
Buck 20 0.44 0.56 
 
Table 6: Probability of protection not being able to see  a phase-to-
phase fault at different QBT states. 
5.4 Results 
The probability calculation result of the adaptive distance 
protection is shown in Table 7. For comparison purposes, the 
reliability calculation for a conventional distance protection in 
transmission lines without a QBT is also shown in this table. 
The adaptive protection has a slightly higher probability of 
zone operation failure compared to conventional schemes. 




fails to clear a 
fault in  in Z2 
Unwanted 
operation 
Adaptive 9.00972E-08 5.07951E-06 
Conventional 8.90569E-08 5.07951E-06 
Table 7: Probability of distance protection failure modes 
According these results, the adaptive distance protection 
performance is as good as conventional distance performance 
in terms of security and dependability. The result is based on 
the assumed QBT operational scenario. Other operational 
scenarios may produce slightly different results. 
6. Conclusion 
A generic methodology for assessing the reliability of 
adaptive protection was proposed. The methodology involves 
collecting information of the protection system and the 
protected primary system then identifying all the failure 
modes and their initiating events. Each failure mode and 
initiating event needs to be quantified using probability 
calculation tools. Bayesian Networks which provide 
flexibility in modelling and simplicity in input data 
requirements has been successfully applied and demonstrated 
in an example case study of an adaptive distance protection. 
The results reveal that when the adaptive protection is 
applied, the probability of failure to operate is only 
marginally higher compared to that of a conventional scheme. 
Moreover there is no significant difference in terms of the 
probability of unwanted operation. 
Since detailed statistical parameters of protective equipment 
are rarely available, the proposed methodology is based on a 
simplified reliability model.  
In future work, the assessment method will be refined, by 
including additional factors such as CT and CVT precision, 
transmission line parameter errors and human error. It is 
believed that the risk assessment using Bayesian network 
approach can provide valuable input to the protection scheme 
design process in the future. 
Appendix  
Transmission Line Section Length: L = 50km  
Line Positive Sequence Impedance: ZL1 = 13.93<86.5°Ω  
Line Zero Sequence Impedance: ZL0 = 39.3<82.7°Ω  
QB Rating = 2000MVA  
QB Tap Range ≈ ±20% of QB rating/±11° phase shift 
Adaptive distance protection settings groups: 
SG1: Zone1  = 80%, Zone 2 = 150% 
SG2: Zone 1 = 80%, Zone2  = 180%  
Relay characteristic angle: RCA = transmission line angle 
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